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Articles
INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEES’
INTENTIONAL TORTS: VICARIOUS
LIABILITY AS A QUASI-SUBSTITUTE FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Catherine M. Sharkey*
Abstract
Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of enterprises
and institutions whose agents have committed intentional acts. Increasingly,
when employers are sued, the line is blurred between the principal’s vicarious
liability for its agent’s acts and its own direct liability for hiring and/or failing to
supervise or control its agent.
From an economic deterrence perspective, the imposition of vicarious liability
induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative measures, including
selective hiring and more stringent supervision and discipline, and, in some
instances, to truncate the scope of their business activities. Negligence-based
direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative
measures (without constraining activity levels to the degree that strict liability
does). This raises questions. Why doesn’t direct employer negligence liability
suffice, in terms of deterring employees’ intentional torts? Or conversely, so long
as there is vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence liability at
all?
In this Article, I argue that, as a form of strict liability, vicarious liability will
have an edge over direct employer negligence liability to the extent that there is a
significant risk of under-detection of the failures of an employer’s preventative
measures. Traces of this under-detection rationale for vicarious liability can be
found in the academic literature and court decisions, but it warrants further
elaboration. The risk of under-detection provides a strong justification for the
expansion of the scope of institutional or employer vicarious liability.
The under-detection rationale, moreover, has the potential to serve as a
coherent framework for some modern doctrinal debates, including whether
punitive damages should be imposed either vicariously or directly upon employers
*
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when their employees commit intentional torts. Specifically, I argue that the
under-detection rationale correspondingly strengthens the case for punitive
damages in direct negligence cases and weakens the case for punitive damages
imposed in vicarious liability cases. Focusing on under-detection, vicarious
liability acts as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages. And seen through this
lens, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages Against a
Principal—typically defended as a “complicity rule” limiting the imposition of
vicarious punitive liability on fairness grounds—is justified on economic
deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence
liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Vicarious liability of employers for employees’ torts can be justified
on economic deterrence grounds—namely, identifying the “cheapest cost
avoider” to hold liable for the tortious conduct. The economic approach
emphasizes both the ability of the employer to induce careful conduct by
its employees and the potential that judgment-proof employees might
escape direct personal liability. The conventional economic accounts
compare vicarious liability of the employer (or principal) with direct
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liability of the (typically) negligent employee (or agent). 1 But these
conventional accounts do not address an emerging paradigm of
institutional liability confronting the courts.
Modern day vicarious liability cases often address the liability of
enterprises and institutions (such as churches, schools, and residential
homes) in a context in which their agents have committed intentional acts.
Increasingly, when an employer is sued, the line is blurred between the
principal’s vicarious liability and its own direct liability. My Article
focuses exclusively on employer liability for employees’ intentional torts
and, in that context, compares vicarious liability with direct liability
against the employer using an optimal deterrence framework.
The imposition of strict liability vicarious liability (“strict-vicarious
liability”) induces employers to adopt cost-justified preventative
measures—including selective hiring and more stringent supervision and
discipline of its employees—and, in some instances, to truncate the scope
of their business activities. But there is a serious potential downside:
when there is nothing the employer reasonably could have done to
prevent an employee’s tort—as may often be the case with intentional
torts—then the imposition of strict liability has no benefit from a
deterrence perspective and simply creates expensive lawsuits.
Negligence-based direct liability likewise induces employers to adopt
cost-justified preventative measures (without constraining activity levels
to the degree that strict liability does). This raises questions. Why doesn’t
direct employer negligence liability suffice in terms of deterring the
commission of intentional torts by employees? Or, conversely, so long as
there is strict-vicarious liability, is there any need for direct negligence
liability at all?
“Scope of employment” stands as a doctrinal dividing line between
the two approaches. The requirement that an employee act within the
“scope of employment” to hold the employer strictly vicariously liable for
the employee’s torts is well established and, more than any other factor,
determines whether a court applies strict or negligence-based liability
against the employer.2 But does it mark a logical and/or efficient
boundary between the imposition of direct negligence and strict-vicarious
liability? The conventional economic account has justified the “scope of
employment” limitation as a proxy for enterprise causation.

1
See infra Part II (discussing the conventional economic account of employer’s vicarious
liability, factoring in the employee’s inability to pay, the employer’s control over the
employee’s actions, and enterprise causation).
2
See infra Part III (looking at employer vicarious liability as whether or not the employee
was acting within the scope of the employment).
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But, apart from the strength of the causal nexus (which in some form
must be satisfied for both strict liability and negligence-based liability),
what justifies the choice between direct negligence and strict-vicarious
liability against the employer? In this Article, I highlight as a significant
factor the likelihood of detection of the failures of an employer’s
preventative measures.3 To the extent that there is a significant risk of
under-detection of the failures of an employer’s preventative measures,
strict-vicarious liability has an edge over direct employer negligence
liability in terms of optimal deterrence. Traces of this under-detection
rationale for vicarious liability can be found in the academic literature as
well as court decisions, but it warrants further elaboration.
The under-detection rationale has the potential, moreover, to serve as
a coherent framework for the significant modern doctrinal debates
regarding whether punitive damages should be imposed either
vicariously or directly upon employers for intentional torts committed by
their employees. Focusing on under-detection, vicarious liability acts as a
quasi-substitute for punitive damages.4 Seen through this lens, several
significant implications follow. The case for punitive damages on top of
direct negligence actions emerges strong, whereas the case for vicarious
punitive damages is comparatively weaker. I introduce a novel burdenshifting and information-forcing approach into this context to strike the
right balance, allowing defendants facing strict-vicarious liability to
immunize themselves against a direct negligence claim—and thereby
punitive damages—by showing that suitable preventative measures are
in place.5 Finally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, Punitive Damages
Against a Principal (“Restatement § 909”)—typically defended as a
“complicity rule” limiting the imposition of vicarious punitive liability on
fairness grounds—is justified on economic deterrence grounds by
allowing punitive damages coupled with direct negligence liability but
limiting its operation in the vicarious liability sphere. 6

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.
5
See infra Section IV.B.3 (discussing this burden-shifting approach).
6
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). See infra Section IV.B.4
(analyzing the Restatement’s “complicity rule” alongside the newly proposed burden-shifting
approach).
3
4
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II. CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNT OF EMPLOYER VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
In two seminal articles, Alan Sykes sets forth the classic economic
argument for employer vicarious liability. 7 In this Part, I summarize the
solid underlying theory and more limited doctrinal application of Sykes’s
framework. While this will serve as a necessary foundation, I emphasize
at the outset that the issues I explore in this Article fall largely outside of
Sykes’s core interest in pitting employer vicarious liability against
employee personal liability, primarily in the context of negligence actions.
In his 1984 article, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, Sykes “inquires
whether a rule of vicarious liability, under which the principal and agent
are jointly and severally liable for the agent’s wrongs, is economically
efficient relative to a rule of personal liability, under which the agent alone
is liable for his wrongs.” 8 Sykes explicitly does not consider “rules that
impose liability on principals for agent wrongs that are attributable to the
principals’ own malfeasance.”9 Sykes reiterates in his 1988 article, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, that “[t]he analysis
throughout . . . contemplates the choice between a rule of personal
liability, under which the employee alone is liable for his wrongs, and a
rule of vicarious liability, under which the employer and employee are
jointly and severally liable.”10
The classic economic justification for employer vicarious liability rests
on three pillars: (1) employee inability to pay; (2) employer control
methods; and (3) enterprise causation.11 First, Sykes’s framework
emphasizes that “the choice between vicarious liability and personal
liability is a significant one whenever the employee is unable to pay
7
See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984)
[hereinafter Sykes, Economics] (discussing the economics related to vicarious liability in
employment relationships); Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563
(1988) [hereinafter Sykes, Boundaries] (defining vicarious liability and how it relates to
employees and employers in the workplace).
8
Sykes, Economics, supra note 7, at 1231–32 (footnotes omitted).
9
Id. at 1231 n.2. Sykes explained, “Rather, the Article deals with situations in which the
principal does not contribute to the wrong except, perhaps, by his failure to monitor the
agent or to design incentives that deter agent malfeasance.” Id. But this caveat flags what I
take up in this Article—whether actions such as the employer’s failure to monitor or detect
employee misconduct warrants the imposition of direct negligence liability and, if so,
whether that alters the soundness of the imposition of vicarious liability.
10
Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 564.
11
See id. at 569, 581–82 (describing supporting economic factors for vicarious liability as
the employee’s inability to pay judgments, the employer’s control methods over
employment, and enterprise causation).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/2

Sharkey: Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicario

2018]

Employees’ Intentional Torts

7

judgments in full under a rule of personal liability.” 12 Second, the
efficiency of vicarious liability rests not only on the potentially diminished
incentives for judgment-proof employees to take adequate care but also
on the potential for employers to be the cheapest cost avoiders in terms of
taking cost-effective measures to induce their employees to take adequate
care.13 Third, Sykes’s seminal contribution is his elaboration of “enterprise
causation”—an employer “causes” its employees’ torts to the extent that
the probability of the employee committing the tort is increased due to the
employment relationship.14
A. Employee Inability to Pay
Sykes’s cost internalization framework starts with the Coasean insight
that, absent transaction costs, the optimal allocation of risk “does not
depend upon where the law initially places liability.”15 However, if the
employee tortfeasor’s assets are less than the potential judgment against
him, the choice between employee personal liability and employer
vicarious liability becomes significant.16
Given that employees and employers internalize future expected
costs, where an employee may be (wholly or partially) judgment-proof,
personal liability creates three inefficiencies: (1) the employee’s incentive
to avoid committing torts is suboptimal, given that he or she will not pay
for the full consequences of his or her actions; (2) the employer’s
profitability is inflated, as it need not expend resources to monitor
employees to minimize the risk of their committing torts (and indeed,
some of the employees’ torts may in fact serve the employer’s bottom line);
and (3) employees may be dissuaded from entering optimal riskallocation agreements with their employers.17 The imposition of vicarious
liability upon the employer is presented as a solution that avoids the
“inefficient expansion of the scale of business activity that results when
the employee cannot pay judgments, . . . improve[s] the efficiency of risksharing by eliminating the incentive . . . to take advantage of [the
employee’s] inability to pay,” and eliminates transaction costs incurred in
negotiating private agreements for the employer to assume liability. 18
Id. at 566.
See id. at 591–92 (detailing the control that employers must have over their employees
and how this control can be a cost-effective measure to induce employees to act with care in
the workplace).
14
See id. at 571 (defining enterprise causation).
15
Id. at 566.
16
See Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 566 (emphasizing that vicarious liability accounts
for judgments for plaintiff that may exceed the employee’s assets).
17
See id. at 567–68.
18
Id. at 568.
12
13
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B. Employer Control
The economic efficiency view of vicarious liability depends on “its
effect upon employees’ incentives to avoid wrongful conduct” where
“[t]he effect of vicarious liability on such incentives depends in turn upon
the devices available to the employer to induce careful behavior and the
costs of those devices.”19
Sykes sets forth the various ways in which employers can exercise
such control. First, employers can directly observe their employees’
activities and announce a desired standard of conduct. 20 Second,
employers can structure compensation and promotion decisions to
incentivize employees over the course of a long-term relationship.21
Finally, in situations in which an employee, whose conduct is
unobservable, is engaged only in a short-term relationship, an employer’s
“threat of an indemnity action against the employee” may be the only
device available to dissuade misconduct.22
The Restatement (Third) of Agency provides a “control test” to
determine the scope of employer vicarious liability for “its employee
acting within the scope of employment.”23 The Restatement justifies the
control test on economic grounds, stating that where an employee’s tort
was not within the scope of activity controllable by the employer,
employer liability would not incentivize the employer to take steps to
prevent such conduct, and an employer could not reasonably insure
against risks that it cannot ascertain or quantify. 24 Overall, Sykes argues
that the criteria are in line with the factors that determine the efficiency of
vicarious liability—observability and the costs to the principal of
monitoring loss-avoidance efforts.25

Id. at 569.
See id. (noting direct observation as an inexpensive device available for employers).
21
See id. at 570 (discussing employer influence over pay and advancement as another
inexpensive incentive available for employers).
22
Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 570.
23
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer is
subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of
employment.”); id. § 7.07(2) (“[A]n employee acts within the scope of employment when
performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the
employer’s control.” (emphasis added)). By contrast, “[w]hen an agent is not an employee, the
principal lacks the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s physical conduct in
how work is performed.” Id. § 7.07 cmt. b.
24
See id. § 7.07 note b (justifying vicarious liability when the employer has a degree of
control over the employee’s actions).
25
See Sykes, Economics, supra note 7, at 1262 (discussing observability and costs of
monitoring loss-avoidance).
19
20
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C. Enterprise Causation
The most innovative feature of Sykes’s framework is his elaboration
of the notion of enterprise causation to forge the link between an
employer’s business activity and its employees’ torts: “An enterprise
‘fully causes’ the wrong of an employee if the dissolution of the enterprise
and subsequent unemployment of the employee would reduce the
probability of the wrong to zero.”26 And vicarious liability “will [thus]
force the enterprise to bear a greater proportion of the cost of the accidents
that it ‘causes.’”27
Applying Sykes’s notion of enterprise causation ensures that each
business “bears the incremental social costs associated with its
operation.”28 Furthermore, it demonstrates the inefficiency of holding an
employer vicariously liable for all employee torts even when the employer
cannot affect either the likelihood that the employee commits a tort or the
likely amount of damages.29 Thus, where the enterprise is fully
responsible for the harm, it “will operate at an efficient level of output only
if it bears, directly or indirectly, all liability for the employee’s [tort].”30
Whereas, where “[t]he probability of a [tort] thus depends upon whether
the employee is employed or not, but (by hypothesis) cannot be affected
by the employer once the employee has been hired,” it is inefficient to
impose either the full value of the tort or no liability on the enterprise. 31
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEE INTENTIONAL TORTS:
“SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT” AS A DIVIDING LINE
We turn now from the conventional economic account—with
employer vicarious liability pitted against employee personal liability,
primarily in the context of employee negligence torts—to my main focus,
namely comparing and contrasting different forms of employer liability in
the context of employee intentional torts. 32 Moreover, I begin with an
exposition of the doctrine of “scope of employment” as it has emerged as
Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 572.
Id. at 584. Sykes thus departs from the Restatement (Third) Agency, which specifically
rejects a “foreseeability” test and any tests that look to whether the fact of employment
“increased the [likelihood] that the tort would occur.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 7.07 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
28
Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 573.
29
See id. at 573–75 (pointing out that vicarious liability for all employee torts may be
inefficient).
30
Id. at 576.
31
Id. at 575.
32
See, e.g., infra Part III.A (targeting vicarious liability); infra Part III.B (focusing on direct
negligence).
26
27
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a dividing line between employer vicarious liability and direct negligence
liability in the context of employee intentional torts before proceeding to
offer a theoretical criticism and posit an alternative approach.
The “scope of employment” doctrine has emerged as a sharp dividing
line separating vicarious employer liability from direct negligence liability
for employee intentional torts in a significant number of jurisdictions.33
Employers can be held vicariously liable for employees who commit
intentional torts while acting within the scope of employment, whereas
employers can be held directly liable for their own negligence in situations
in which employees commit intentional torts outside the scope of
employment. For example, “New Jersey would not permit Plaintiff to
proceed on her claim of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and
retention in light of Defendants’ admission that [the employee] was acting
within the course and scope of his employment.”34 And in Florida, courts

33
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (noting
that jurisdictions differ as to whether direct negligence theories can be applied where the
employee acted within the scope of employment and that, in some jurisdictions, punitive
damages may be appropriate on one theory but not the other).
Indeed, the doctrinal confusion goes even deeper. There are myriad examples of courts
that have altogether confused the requirements and purposes of vicarious liability with
direct liability. See, e.g., Bishop v. Miller, Nos. 4-97-30, 4-97-31, 1998 WL 135802, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1998) (dismissing a claim of negligent supervision on the ground that the
alleged sexual battery was “not within the scope of [defendant’s] employment” as is required
for respondeat superior); Cook v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 725, 732 (D. Minn.
1994) (“[U]nder the rubric of negligent supervision, in order to successfully state a claim
against an employer, the claimant must establish that the employee who caused an injury
did so within the scope of his or her employment.”). See generally Paula Dalley, Destroying
the Scope of Employment, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 637 (2016) (discussing the technical errors courts
make in deciding employer liability cases).
I am not taking on this even “lower hanging fruit” doctrinal confusion for two reasons.
First, it is not theoretically very interesting (although may nonetheless be important to
correct, given the stakes of these cases). Second, it does not appear to be as widespread an
issue, in part given ample evidence that appellate courts often correct trial courts that make
this mistake. See, e.g., Doe v. Borromeo, No. 305162, 2012 WL 4215032, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct.
App. Sept. 20, 2012) (remanding a case to trial court for failing to address plaintiff’s negligent
supervision claim and only addressing vicarious liability); Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 48
P.3d 137, 144 (Or. 2002) (noting the danger of confusion); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 588–
89 (Ohio 1991) (pointing out that the appellate court had conflated negligent hiring and
respondeat superior).
34
Lee ex rel. Estate of Lee v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). See also id. at 313 (“Although New Jersey has indeed recognized the tort of negligent
hiring/retention, its rationale for doing so appears to rest upon a ‘concern for the safety and
welfare of the general public, and the need to assess liability for the vicious acts of employees,
in the absence of respondeat superior liability.’” (quoting 18 N.J. PRAC. EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12.34
(West 1998))); Bennett v. T & F Distrib. Co., 285 A.2d 59, 60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971)
(“If [the employee] had been acting within the scope of employment when he assaulted [the
customer], it would be immaterial whether [the employer] was negligent in hiring [the
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have likewise restricted employer direct liability claims to realms in which
the employee commits an intentional tort while acting outside the scope
of employment.35 Thus, “Florida law requires that a claim for negligent
retention allege acts committed outside the course and scope of
employment.”36
Moreover, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317, Duty of Master to Control
Conduct of Servant (“Restatement § 317”) seems to embrace this approach as
well.37 Restatement § 317 provides that “[a] master is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the
scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming
others . . . .”38 Indeed, the commentary clarifies that “[t]he rule stated in
this Section is applicable only when the servant is acting outside the scope
of his employment. If the servant is acting within the scope of his
employment, the master may be vicariously liable under the principles of
the law of Agency.”39
Significant practical implications flow from scope of employment
forging a doctrinal dividing line between vicarious and direct employer
liability. First, an employer might have a strategic reason to concede that
an employee’s intentional tort falls within the “scope of employment” so
as to foreclose a direct liability claim, especially if the latter is either the
sole or probable route to recovering punitive damages.40
Second, the division has implications for the type of evidence that can
be admitted to support the claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court, for
example, acknowledged:

employee], for in such instance [the employer] would be liable on the theory of respondeat
superior.”), cert. denied, 289 A.2d 795 (N.J. 1972).
35
See, e.g., Belizaire v. Miami, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (emphasizing that
direct liability can only be applied to employers when the employee commits an intentional
tort outside the scope of employment).
36
Id. at 1215. Defendant’s motion to dismiss a negligent retention claim was granted on
the grounds that “the officers here were acting within the scope of their employment.” Id.
37
Note, however, that such an interpretation of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 is in
tension with Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. h (“In a given case the employer may
be liable both on the ground that he was personally negligent and on the ground that the
conduct was within the scope of employment.”), and Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 cmt.
b (explaining that an employer, even when not in control of an employee’s actions, may be
liable via direct negligence or fault theories). See, e.g., Pruitt v. Pavelin, 685 P.2d 1347, 1359–
60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages on a scope-ofemployment theory and compensatory damages on a negligent hiring theory).
38
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
39
Id. § 317 cmt. a.
40
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (noting that
in “cases [where the employer is liable on direct negligence and vicarious liability theories],
the fact that the employer was personally negligent may be important, however, in
jurisdictions in which punitive damages are awarded”).
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[T]he admission of evidence which must be offered to
prove a negligent hiring, training, supervision, or
entrustment claim—evidence such as a prior driving
record, an arrest record, or other records of past mishaps
or misbehavior by the employee—will be highly
prejudicial if combined with a stipulation by the
employer that it will ultimately be vicariously liable for
the employee’s . . . acts.41
But the court nonetheless concluded:
[T]he argument that the court must entirely preclude a
cause of action to protect the jury from considering
prejudicial evidence gives impermissibly short-shrift to
the trial court’s ability to judge the admission of evidence
and to protect the integrity of trial, and to the jury’s ability
to follow the trial court’s instructions.42
Should an employer’s direct negligence liability thus be reserved only
for situations in which an employee’s intentional tort falls outside the
scope of employment? To the extent courts expand the realm of “scope of
employment” for employee intentional torts, should they concomitantly
limit the range for direct negligence-based liability?
A. Vicarious Liability for Intentional Torts “Within the Scope of Employment”
Courts are, by and large, willing to consider imposing vicarious
liability on employers for employees’ intentional torts so long as they are
acting “within the scope of employment.”43 But to date, courts have
typically construed “within the scope of employment” extremely
narrowly in the context of employee intentional torts—primarily only
those actions employees take in the service of their employer’s purposes,
typically where they have acted with apparent or actual authorization by
their employer.

James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 331 (S.C. 2008).
Id. Nor was the court satisfied with the rule coupled with a “punitive damages
exception”—as this would lead to a rule of “little utility” or else force a judgment regarding
the employer’s conduct by the court based only on the pleadings. Id. at 332.
43
See, e.g., Blair v. Def. Servs., 386 F.3d 623, 627–28 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding intentional torts
are not always outside the scope of employment under vicarious liability in Virginia, but
employee’s intentional actions fell outside scope of employment); Doe v. Samaritan
Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1990) (imposing vicarious liability on an employer
for an employee’s intentional tort “within the scope of employment”).
41
42
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The classic Ira Bushey & Sons case and one of its progeny, Taber v.
Maine, are the exceptions that prove the rule.44 Two visionary Second
Circuit judges (applying the law of admiralty and Guam/California,
respectively), Henry Friendly and Guido Calabresi, articulated a much
broader rationale for a military employer’s vicarious liability for its
serviceman employee’s intentional tort, based on economic theories of
enterprise causation and employer control. 45

44
Ira Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968); Taber v. Maine, 67
F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). For cases citing Ira Bushey but nonetheless adopting the “motive
test,” see Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 347–48 (Alaska 1990) (holding, in
the context of a therapist’s abuse of a patient, that the employer could be vicariously liable,
given that “where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the
employee’s legitimate work activities, the ‘motivation to serve’ test will have been satisfied”);
Sharkey v. Lasmo, 992 F. Supp. 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[I]n order to be within the scope of
employment, the tort must have been committed in part to benefit the employer and the
employer must have received some benefit. . . . [A]s the Court of Appeals has recognized [in
Ira Bushey], ‘courts have gone to considerable lengths to find such a purpose.’” (citations
omitted)); U.S. v. Davis, 666 F. Supp. 641, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior an employer can be held vicariously liable for damages caused by its
employees when the employee was acting within the scope of employment [as per Ira
Bushey]. An employee acts within the scope of employment when he or she furthers the
employer’s interest.”); Dashner v. Hamburg Ctr. Dep’t Pub. Welfare, 62 Pa. D. & C.4th 380,
387 (Pa. C.P. Berks July 7, 2003) (“[A] claim for vicarious liability cannot stand where a
servant’s intentional torts are actuated by personal motives only and are not in furtherance
of the interests of his employer.”); Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 942 (D. Conn.
1977) (“[T]he relevant question is whether the employee acted from a personal motive or
with a motivation to serve his employer’s interests.”).
For cases rejecting Ira Bushey outright, see Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 371–72
(Ky. 2005) (rejecting Ira Bushey); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1043 n.32 (Utah
1991) (declining to apply the “premises rule” from Ira Bushey); Kuehn v. White, 600 P.2d 679,
683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that if vicarious liability is to be expanded, it should come
from the legislature); Pickering v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 460 F.2d 820, 823 n.7 (3d Cir. 1972)
(finding no Ira Bushey-style expansion of vicarious liability under New Jersey law); Sandman
v. Hagan, 154 N.W. 2d 113, 118–19 (Iowa 1967) (“If employer [vicarious] liability is to be
extended [as in Ira Bushey], we believe it should come from the legislature . . . .”).
The U.S. Supreme Court, citing Ira Bushey, recognized that “[t]he concept of scope of
employment has not always been construed to require a motive to serve the employer,” but
nonetheless rejected this approach under Title VII sexual harassment. See Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 757 (1998) (“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a
supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.”). See also Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–802 (1998) (describing the factors involved in determining liability
for torts committed by employees outside the scope of their employment).
45
See Ira Bushey, 398 F.2d at 170 (finding that the motive analysis was not the proper test
for imposing vicarious liability on the employer in this case); Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029,
1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (“California has taken the lead in developing the modern law of respondeat
superior even before Bushey. And, so, rounding out the circle, we now reach the same
conclusion as did Judge Friendly, twenty-six years ago.”).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 2

14
1.

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Narrow Recognition by Courts

Most jurisdictions hold that employee intentional torts can only be
considered within the scope of employment under extremely limited
circumstances. As one court aptly summed up, “As a general rule, it is
not within the scope of an employee’s employment to commit an assault
upon a third person.”46
The majority position is that intentional torts are only within the scope
of employment when committed to serve the employer’s interest, namely:
the act is one which is “fairly and naturally incident to the
business,” and is done “while the servant was engaged
upon the master’s business and [is] done, although
mistakenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the
master’s interest, or from some impulse of emotion which
naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to
perform the master’s business.”47
By contrast, courts have held that “[w]hen ‘an assault is purely personal
to the servant, having no real connection with the master’s business, the
doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to fasten liability upon the
master.’”48 Jurisdictions often cabin vicarious liability in this manner by
deploying the actual or apparent agency doctrine:
To recover under a theory of vicarious liability such as
actual or apparent agency, it must be shown that the
agent or apparent agent’s conduct was motivated, at least
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer. It is
entirely clear that responsibility for the intentional
wrongful acts of a servant-employee may be visited upon
his master-employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior only when that conduct in some way furthers the
interests of the master or is at least motivated by a

Rodebush ex rel. Rodebush v. Okla. Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Okla.
1993).
47
Id.
48
Ayers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Moreover,
courts reach mixed conclusions on whether to recognize respondeat superior in the hybrid
situation in which “an employee commits an intentional tort with the dual purpose of
furthering the employer’s interest and venting personal anger.” Sunseri v. Puccia, 422 N.E.2d
925, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
46
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purpose to serve those interests, rather than the
employee’s own.49
2.

Whither Enterprise Causation Rationale?

In the context of employee intentional torts, courts seem especially
wary of the imposition of vicarious employer liability. As described
above, courts typically recognize vicarious liability only in the more
limited situations in which the employee acts to serve the employer’s
purposes under some variant of actual or apparent authority. But this
essentially transforms vicarious liability into a form of direct liability
(which would apply in situations in which the employer authorized the
employee’s act). In any event, it is a far cry from Sykes’s notion of
enterprise causation.
Against this backdrop, two cases stand out in terms of their
endorsement (implicit and explicit, respectively) of the enterprise
causation rationale.50 The first is the classic case Ira Bushey & Sons v. United
Ayers, 941 F. Supp. at 1169.
The Second Circuit appears to be a hotbed for the enterprise causation rationale for
vicarious liability. See Cronin v. Hertz Corp., 818 F.2d 1064, 1067–69 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting
the Ira Bushey approach in a case applying Connecticut law). New York state and federal
courts cite Ira Bushey frequently. See, e.g., Riviello v. Waldron, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (N.Y.
1979) (“Among the factors to be weighed are: [1] the connection between the time, place and
occasion for the act; [2] the history of the relationship between employer and employee as
spelled out in actual practice; [3] whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee;
[4] the extent of departure from normal methods of performance; [5] and whether the specific
act was one that the employer could reasonably have anticipated.” (citing Ira Bushey)).
The Ira Bushey case and enterprise causation rationale also resonates in the Seventh
Circuit. See, e.g., Wilson v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 841 F.2d 1347, 1353–56
& n.2 (7th Cir. 1988) (directing “the factfinder to determine if ‘(a) the tort arose during an
errand of the sort that probably would not have occurred absent the existence of the
employment relationship, or (b) for some other reason, the probability of the tort was
substantially increased by the existence of the employment relationship” (quoting Sykes,
Boundaries, supra note 7, at 587)); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc.,
755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The reasoning behind this rule [of vicarious liability] is
rarely articulated, though the more modern cases tend to rely on a risk allocation theory: the
employer, not the innocent plaintiff, should bear the cost of the torts of its employees as a
required cost of doing business, insofar as such torts are reasonably foreseeable and the
employer is a more efficient cost avoider than the injured plaintiff.” (citations omitted)).
It has also been embraced in a few additional jurisdictions. See, e.g., Leafgreen v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 280–81 (S.D. 1986) (adopting a modified foreseeability
test wherein “foreseeable” means that “the employee’s conduct must not be so unusual or
startling that it would be unfair to include the loss caused by the injury among the costs of
the employer’s business”); Richard v. Hall, 874 So.2d 131, 137–38 (La. 2004) (noting that “[i]n
determining whether a particular accident may be associated with the employer’s business
enterprise, the court must essentially decide whether the particular accident is a part of the
more or less inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise,” and that “the scope of employment test
examines the employment-related risk of injury,” such that “[t]he inquiry requires the trier
49
50
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States, in which the Second Circuit, applying admiralty law, affirmed the
imposition of vicarious liability on the Coast Guard for vandalism by a
drunken seaman.51 In this famous decision, Judge Henry Friendly
rehearsed various justifications for vicarious liability, including the
narrowest “serves the master’s purpose” and cheapest cost-avoider
rationales (which he disparaged, though as a purely theoretical matter, not
on the basis of any empirical evidence), before landing (implicitly) on an
enterprise causation rationale—inquiring whether the risk is
“characteristic of [the] activities” of the enterprise, where “the activities of
the ‘enterprise’ do not reach into areas where the servant does not create
risks different from those attendant on the activities of the community in
general.”52
A quarter-century later, drawing upon Ira Bushey, Judge Guido
Calabresi (applying the law of Guam, which looks to California law for
guidance) explicitly endorsed the enterprise causation rationale in Taber v.
Maine.53 The court held that the United States was vicariously liable for
of fact to determine whether the employee’s tortious conduct was so closely connected in
time, place and causation to his employment-duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly
attributable to the employer’s business, as compared to conduct motivated by purely
personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interests”); Carroll Air Sys.,
Inc. v. Greenbaum, 629 So.2d 914, 916–17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“The underlying
philosophy which holds an employer liable for an employee’s negligent acts is the deeply
rooted sentiment that a business enterprise should not be able to disclaim responsibility for
accidents which may fairly be said to be the result of its activity.” (emphasis added));
Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States, Case No. 8:12-cv-856-T-30TBM, 2014 WL 12625781, at *4–
5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2014) (holding U.S. government vicariously liable for damage caused
by a Marine’s drunk-driving car accident, given that, but for his employment, the accident
would not have occurred).
51
See Ira Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1968)
(endorsing the enterprise causation rationale for vicarious liability imposed on employers).
52
Id. at 171–72. See also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise
Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1281 n.45 (1997) (discussing Sykes’s definition of enterprise
causation as “very similar to Friendly’s characteristic risk criterion”).
53
Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Ira Bushey). “California has
adopted the rationale that the employer’s liability should extend beyond his actual or
possible control over the employees to include risks inherent in or created by the enterprise
because he, rather than the innocent injured party, is best able to spread the risk through
prices, rates or liability insurance.” Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 618
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Ira Bushey). See also Mary M. v. Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343–
44 (Cal. 1991) (citing Ira Bushey and noting that vicarious liability can be justified by the need
to ensure that the victim’s losses are distributed amongst those who benefit from the
enterprise that gave rise to the harm); Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty.,
220 Cal. App. 3d 864, 878 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (reasoning that “[i]n the context of the
good faith motion, [one] must be deemed exposed to the possibility of full vicarious liability
to the plaintiff” when there is an act or omission occurring within the scope of employment);
Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
“liability is frequently determined by who is best able to spread the risk of loss through the
prices charged”).
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injuries caused by a Navy serviceman’s drunk-driving accident.54
According to Judge Calabresi, the vicarious liability doctrine is
“concerned with the allocation of the cost of industrial injury,” and thus
its applicability should turn on the “relationship between the
servicemember’s behavior and the costs of the military enterprise.” 55
Moreover, Judge Calabresi reasoned, “[G]iven the pervasive control that
the military exercises over its personnel while they are on a base, it is
totally in keeping with the doctrine of respondeat superior to allocate the
costs of base operations to the government.”56
B. Direct Negligence Liability for Intentional Torts “Outside the Scope of
Employment”
We move now from employer liability for employees’ commission of
intentional torts “within the scope of employment” to those committed
“outside the scope of employment.” Restatement § 317 (“Duty of Master
to Control Conduct of Servant”) provides the contours under which “[a]
master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from
intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them.”57 Section 317 liability attaches
when the servant “(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or
upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or (ii) is
using a chattel of the master.”58 Not all jurisdictions have expressly
adopted § 317, but all jurisdictions seem to recognize some form of direct
liability against the employer for negligent hiring, supervision, or
retention.59
1.

Narrow Recognition by Courts

Courts have recognized direct employer liability for employees’
intentional torts committed outside the scope of employment in very
limited situations.60 As succinctly summarized:

See Taber, 67 F.3d at 1050.
Id. at 1036–37 (emphasis omitted).
56
Id. at 1037 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory
of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 914–15 (1981).
57
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
58
Id. § 317(a)(i)–(ii).
59
See, e.g., 53 N.Y. JURIS. EMP. REL. § 391 (explaining when direct liability is imposed on
employers for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention).
60
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
54
55
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[C]ases that rely on [Restatement (Second) of Torts] section
317 generally involve rather obvious acts of negligence on
the part of the employer—for example, the knowing
retention of an incompetent employee or the knowing
allowance of dangerous practices by an employee even
though relatively inexpensive measures could have
stopped the practices.61
The two prongs of direct employer liability, whether pursuant to
causes of action based on § 317 or negligent hiring, supervision, or
retention—knowledge and identification of preventative measures—are
demanding threshold requirements and thus constitute formidable
barriers to employer direct liability.
a.

Knowledge Requirement

The knowledge requirement, as construed by the courts, presents a
seemingly insuperable barrier to employer direct liability in the context of
employee intentional torts. In case after case, courts have dismissed such
direct liability claims against employers in a variety of settings, including
ones in which employers provide services to vulnerable populations (and
thus might be thought to have fiduciary duties above and beyond any
duty to take reasonable care)—such as rehabilitation centers, schools, and
churches—on the grounds that the employer lacked knowledge of the risk
posed by the employee.62 Moreover, courts have insisted upon an
exacting type of particular knowledge of the specific risks involved. 63
Even where the employer was on notice regarding an employee’s prior
acts of misconduct (such that the employer might have been expected to
Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 591 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. E.B.O., 915 So. 2d 694, 695, 696–97 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a patient in a rehabilitation center who was allegedly raped in a
company-owned van during the course of an employee’s assigned responsibility to transport
the patient between facilities did not establish a negligent supervision claim against the
center because the employer was not on notice that the employee was prone to commit the
tortious or criminal act); Stephenson v. Sch. Bd. Polk Cty., 467 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that a school board was not liable for negligent supervision because “there
was no indication from the record that [it] was put on notice of the harmful propensities of
[its] employees”); Willis v. Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 411 So. 2d 245, 246 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (“[T]o state a cause of action for the tort of negligent hiring or retention recognized in
Florida, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the employer was put on notice of the
harmful propensities of the employee.” (citations omitted)); Iglesia Cristiana Casa Senor, Inc.
v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a church was not liable for
sexual assault of a minor by a pastor because “it [did not have] constructive or actual notice
that [he] was unfit to work as a pastor at the [c]hurch”).
63
See Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., 915 So. 2d at 696 (giving an example where specific risks
and particular knowledge were analyzed in the context of employer liability).
61
62
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take extra precautionary measures), courts have rejected negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention claims where such prior bad acts were different
in kind from the type of intentional tort committed in the case at hand. 64
b.

Specification of Preventative Measures

Moreover, even if the knowledge barrier is overcome, negligencebased employer direct liability forces the plaintiff to specify the
preventative measures that should have been taken. Placing this burden
on the plaintiff serves in practice to restrict the domain of measures
considered by the court. Consider, for example, Roman Catholic Bishop v.
Superior Court of San Diego County, a California case in which a fourteenyear-old girl and her family sued a church because of a priest’s alleged
molestation of the girl.65 Given that the priest had no criminal history of
child molestation, a background check alone would not have uncovered
his propensity to commit such an act.66 The plaintiffs identified specific
preventative measures that the church nonetheless failed to take,
including: (a) an investigation of the priest’s background to determine if
the priest previously had sexual relationships with adults; and
(b) requiring the priest “to undergo a psychological evaluation before
hiring him.”67 The court refused to impose a duty upon the church either
to undertake such an investigation or to require a psychological
evaluation because both measures would have unacceptably interfered
with the priest’s privacy.68 And, having considered the specific untaken
precautions alleged by the plaintiffs, the court ended its analysis. 69
Many jurisdictions combine stringency on the knowledge
requirement with exacting specification of preventative measures. For
64
Dibrill v. Normandy Assocs., Inc., 383 S.W.3d 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012), is illustrative. In
that case, an employer defendant was granted summary judgment in a negligent hiring claim
“because employe[e]’s prior acts of misconduct—which involved slapping his wife and a
physical altercation with a co-worker—did not ‘put him at risk to commit the sexual offense
on plaintiff’ such that the employer could be held liable for negligent hiring.” Id. at 88. The
court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer on plaintiff’s negligent
retention and supervision claims “because the combination of the employee’s preemployment assaults and a sexually harassing comment he made during his employment
did not ‘put employer on notice that [the employee] had dangerous sexual propensities that
it would be foreseeable that [the employee] would sexually assault a building visitor.” Id.
For further consideration of the costs of relaxing this “knowledge of the precise risk” prong,
see infra note 106.
65
See Roman Catholic Bishop v. Super. Ct. San Diego Cty., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 400–01
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
66
See id. at 404–05.
67
Id. at 405–06.
68
See id.
69
See id. (concluding summary judgment in favor of priest was proper on negligent hiring
and supervision).
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example, to make out a prima facie case for negligent hiring in Florida, a
plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the employer was required to make an appropriate
investigation of the employee and failed to do so; (2) an
appropriate investigation would have revealed the
unsuitability of the employee for the particular duty to be
performed or for employment in general; and (3) it was
unreasonable for the employer to hire the employee in
light of the information he knew or should have known.70
In Malicki v. Doe, another church abuse case, the Florida Supreme
Court evaluated whether the defendants could be held liable for negligent
hiring in light of their failure “to make inquiries into [the priest’s]
background, qualifications, reputation, work history, and/or criminal
history prior to employing him in the capacity of Associate Pastor.” 71 The
upshot is that, typically, only in the most blatantly obvious cases of an
untaken precaution—for example, where employers completely fail to
inquire into the employee’s background—do courts recognize employer
negligence in the context of employee intentional torts. 72
2.

Rationale for Limitations on Direct Employer Liability

Courts have reasoned that Restatement § 317 must impose a narrow
duty on employers—or else a tight causal link between the employer’s acts
or omissions and the employee’s tort or crime—in order to prevent
employers from becoming guarantors of their employees.73 As one court
elaborated:
The limitations expressed in § 317(a)(i) are intended to
restrict the master’s liability for a servant’s intentional
acts outside the course and scope of employment to
situations where either the master has some degree of
control of the premises where the act occurred or where
the master, because of the employment relationship, has
Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 362 (Fla. 2002).
Id. The court also examined whether “the Church Defendants negligently placed
[plaintiffs] under the supervision of Malicki [the priest], when the Church Defendants either
knew or should have known that Malicki had the propensity to commit sexual assaults and
molestations.” Id.
72
See, e.g., Blair v. Def. Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding a jury
could find employer negligent for failing to run a background check on the employee).
73
See Watson v. Hialeah, 552 So. 2d 1146, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (reaffirming the
causal link between employer’s action and the crime).
70
71
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placed the servant in a position to obtain access to some
premises that are not controlled by the master. 74
Similar to the enterprise causation rationale, “Such limitations serve to
restrict the master’s liability for a servant’s purely personal conduct which
has no relationship to the servant’s employment and the master’s ability
to control the servant’s conduct or prevent harm.”75
In this way, direct liability claims often intersect with acts considered
within the scope of employment due to the requirement that liability
attaches to acts occurring at the employer’s business location or
committed during the conduct of the employer’s business. As the Tenth
Circuit noted, in cases of employer direct liability:
[T]he existence of a duty to the injured party was based
on actions against a customer or co-worker which took
place on the working premises during the time
employment services were normally rendered. In none
of such cases was the employee not acting in the course of
employment, nor was the injurious action removed from
the employer’s premises or without any nexus to the
employer’s operations.76
But, once again, courts have read these limitations very broadly. For
example, in Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, Napieralski was
allegedly sexually assaulted by a minister while meeting with him at the
minister’s church-provided home.77 The meeting was neither for church
business nor spiritual counseling.78 Napieralski argued that the church
was negligent in supervising its employee, but the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court rejected this argument, partly because “[w]here an
employer does provide a residence for employees, it is very different from
the employer’s premises as addressed in the Restatement. The employee
retains rights of privacy and quiet enjoyment in the residence that are not
subject to close supervision or domination by the employer.” 79

74
Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001).
75
Id. at 582–83.
76
Girard v. Trade Prof’ls, Inc., 13 F. App’x 865, 869–70 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted).
77
See Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 802 A.2d 391, 392 (Me. 2002).
78
Id. at 393.
79
Id.
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C. Revisiting “Scope of Employment” as a Dividing Line
The doctrinal concept of “scope of employment” acts as a proxy for
causal nexus or employer control—some notion of which must exist across
both employer vicarious liability and direct negligence liability realms. In
this Part, I challenge the theoretical and empirical soundness of the courts’
use of “scope of employment” as a dividing line between the availability
of vicarious liability and direct negligence claims against employers for
employee intentional torts.
First, we consider the extent to which the doctrine of vicarious
liability, with its insistence upon an employee acting within the “scope of
employment” as a prerequisite for employer vicarious liability, comports
with an economic efficiency justification. Recall that Sykes argued that the
“scope of employment” limitation on employer vicarious liability was
efficient so long as it aligned with his notion of “enterprise causation.” 80
As we have seen above, however, Sykes’s conception of “enterprise
causation” is very broad as compared with the courts’ (Friendly, J. and
Calabresi, J., notwithstanding) extremely narrow recognition of what falls
within the “scope of employment,” particularly with respect to employee
intentional torts.81
Second, with respect to the choice between employer vicarious
liability and employer direct negligence, Sykes claimed that “[w]hen the
‘causal’ relationship between the activities of the entity subject to vicarious
liability and the prospective wrong is weak . . . vicarious liability based on
negligence [i.e., direct negligence liability] is superior to strict vicarious
liability.”82 Thus, considering § 317 direct liability, Sykes concluded that
“if the scope of employment is circumscribed to encompass only those
torts substantially ‘caused’ by the business enterprise, section 317’s
approach to torts committed outside the scope of employment is clearly
efficient.”83 In other words, if scope of employment serves as a proxy for
enterprise causation, where this causal link is weak, it makes sense to
impose the heightened requirements of negligence-based liability (namely
knowledge and identification of preventative measures).84 In this way, the
See Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 571.
See id. at 587. Sykes likewise discovered a divergence between doctrine and theory
when he examined (to a limited extent) the scope of employment rule in the context of the
“frolic and detour” motor vehicle tort cases at the rule’s boundary. Id. (describing how courts
decided whether the employee acted outside the scope of employment in a “frolic or detour”
by examining either the length of the detour or else the foreseeability of the detour). See also
Sykes, Economics, supra note 7, at 1265 (noting, in the context of service station torts, that
courts used “indicia of control [that] appear[ed] to have little or no economic significance”).
82
Sykes, Boundaries, supra note 7, at 579.
83
Id. at 590–91.
84
Id. at 577, 590–91.
80
81
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heightened duty requirements in some sense compensate for the weaker
causal link.
But, apart from the strength of causal link, are additional factors
relevant when choosing between vicarious liability and direct negligence
approaches? Here, we return to the basic (though sometimes overlooked)
point that vicarious liability is a form of strict liability and thus the
foundational differences between strict liability and negligence pertain.
Sykes alluded to one of these—namely administrative costs:
One must always be alert to the possibility that one
liability rule may be cheaper to administer than another
or may tend to produce fewer meritless suits. With
respect to the choice between strict vicarious liability and
vicarious liability based on negligence, the negligence
approach probably leads to incrementally higher
administrative costs associated with the need to litigate
the employer’s negligence, whereas the strict liability
approach probably leads to incrementally higher
administrative costs associated with a higher number of
lawsuits.85
Curiously missing, however, is any consideration of another
potentially significant factor—risk of under-detection of employer
preventative devices. We thus turn to consider the theoretical and
practical relevance of this fundamental factor, which then sets the stage
for our re-examination of the rationales for employer liability for
employee intentional torts.
IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AS A QUASI-SUBSTITUTE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In this Part, I highlight under-detection of employer preventative
measures as a significant factor in the choice between strict-vicarious
liability and direct negligence theories. 86 More ambitiously, I then connect
deterrence theory and the under-detection rationale to the doctrines
governing employer liability (vicarious and direct, including punitive
damages) for employee intentional torts. 87 Several novel implications
follow.
First, strict-vicarious liability may be more efficient than direct
negligence liability where there is a significant risk of under-detection of
potential employer preventative measures. Thus, where such significant
85
86
87

Id. at 579.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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risk of under-detection exists, the scope for strict-vicarious liability—
regardless of “scope of employment”—should be expanded in the context
of negligent hiring, supervising, and retention scenarios.88
Second, courts should recognize calls for punitive damages
predicated on claims for negligent hiring, supervising, or training (e.g.,
§ 317 direct negligence claims). Such punitive damages should be
awarded where compensatory damages will under-deter, including
where the employer’s failures to exercise reasonable care will likely be
under-detected. Indeed, the risk of under-detection seems particularly
salient in this context of employee intentional torts, where vicarious
liability claims (at least “within the scope of employment”) are justified at
least in part on this rationale.
Third, where strict-vicarious liability is justified on the basis of underdetection, then vicarious liability for punitive damages may over-deter.
Punitive damages—at least imposed to force internalization of the total
costs of harms due to under-detection—would not seem warranted. This
could provide a rationale for courts’ refusal to recognize negligence-based
claims where an employer has conceded that its employee committed an
intentional tort within the scope of employment. However, a better
strategy would be for courts to deploy a burden-shifting approach to force
the employer to come forward with information regarding the
precautionary preventative measures in place in order to foreclose
punitive damages.89
With these three propositions in mind, we can re-examine the
complicity rule for employer liability for punitive damages (Restatement
§ 909, Punitive Damages Against a Principal).90 It appears to mitigate the
risk of over-deterrence by requiring some degree of employer fault—
namely employee actions are “authorized” per § 909(a) or “ratified or
approved” per § 909(d).91 It limits “scope of employment” liability to
agents acting in a “managerial capacity” per § 909(c).92 Finally, punitive
damages per § 909(b) (“reckless[ly]” employing an “unfit” agent) is akin
to punitive damages under § 908 (“Punitive Damages”) with direct
negligence liability as a predicate.93 Seen in this light, § 909 can be
defended on efficiency grounds.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.3 (elaborating on this novel proposed burden-shifting approach).
90
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (listing the
requirements for punitive damages in a vicarious liability case).
91
Id. § 909(a), (d).
92
Id. § 909(c).
93
Id. § 909(b). See also id. § 908 (explaining that the purposes of punitive damages are to
punish and to deter); infra Section IV.B.2.b (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908,
Punitive Damages).
88
89
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A. Under-Detection of Employer Preventative Measures
Under-detection of employers’ failures to take measures to prevent
their employees’ intentional torts may be prevalent, especially within
large employers and institutions with a complex internal organization. 94
As a theoretical matter, where such under-detection is a concern, strict
liability will have an edge over negligence liability in terms of inducing
the employer to more carefully screen, monitor, and train its employees. 95
Alternatively, punitive damages may be warranted to induce the
employer to take requisite care.96
1.

Vicarious Liability

Gary Schwartz (in an under-appreciated article) was perhaps the first
to highlight the practical and theoretical argument for strict-vicarious
liability.97 Schwartz concluded that “[t]he intriguing benefit of strict
liability . . . is that it can do a better job than a negligence regime in
achieving that regime’s own goal of encouraging the employer’s costjustified risk-reducing measures.”98
Schwartz makes two primary claims. First, Schwartz picks up on the
administrative costs issue, noting that “strict liability spares the legal
system the costs of investigating and then litigating the negligence
issue.”99 As Martha Chamallas further elaborates, “[S]ome victims will be
able to establish that employers were independently negligent for failing
to screen, train, or monitor the offending employee. Such a direct
94
See infra Section IV.A.1 (discussing strict-vicarious liability’s edge over direct employer
negligence in such situations).
95
There is vast economic literature on the choice between strict liability and negligence
regimes on the basis of myriad factors, injecting more complications into the equation, such
as legal uncertainty. Compare, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 986 (1984) (“[U]ncertainty
can produce incentives to over- or undercomply even when damages are calculated
exactly.”), with, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence
Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 427–47 (1989) (arguing that once the issue of causation is factored
into negligence liability, it is more likely that individuals will take too little care rather than
too much care).
My aim here is not to make a theoretical contribution to this literature. Rather, my goal
is simply to draw attention to a well-established factor—under-detection—that remains
relatively unexplored in the debate surrounding employer liability for employee intentional
torts.
96
See infra Section IV.A.2.
97
See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69
S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1740–41 (1996) (pointing out that “the strict liability doctrine of vicarious
liability” is often ignored in negligence cases).
98
Id. at 1760.
99
Id.
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negligence claim, however, is far more difficult and costly to prove . . . .”100
In sum, direct negligence liability is more uncertain and difficult to prove
than strict liability.
Second, Schwartz highlights that an employer’s failure to adopt costjustified precautions might not be detected.101 If employers anticipate this,
they will lack adequate incentives to take care.102 Moreover, it seems likely
that when the defendant is a large institution, such failures will be
especially difficult for the court to identify. 103 Jennifer Arlen and Reinier
Kraakman have elaborated on this under-detection rationale in the context
of the choice between negligence and strict liability regimes in controlling
corporate misconduct.104
At the same time, there are public policy concerns about strict liability
going too far.105 Indeed, the threshold knowledge requirement of § 317
direct negligence liability—especially if it is deployed in situations with a
weak causal link—promotes efficiency to the extent that it avoids inducing

100
Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 133,
136 (2013); id. at 153 (“Vicarious liability under this account saves the cost of investigating
the existence of the untaken precaution and then litigating the negligence issue.”).
101
See Schwartz, supra note 97, at 1760–64.
102
Id. at 1756.
103
See id. at 1764.
104
See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). Arlen and Kraakman share my main
focus on institutional liability (namely “how should the law structure the liability of the
firm?”), and highlight under-detection as a significant factor in the optimal regime choice for
inducing preventive measures. Id. at 689, 705. They advocate a mixed regime that includes
elements of both strict liability and negligence in the context of corporate misconduct. Their
main goal is to create proper incentives for companies to monitor, investigate, and report
employee wrongdoing. See id. at 694 (“Strict liability clearly dominates where corporate
liability is deployed to encourage the private sanctioning of corporate agents, and is weakly
preferable where it is a means of inducing firms to adopt preventive measures. However,
duty-based liability is generally better able to induce firms to undertake optimal policing
measures such as monitoring, investigating, and reporting.”).
105
See Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436 (S.D. 2008). In Kirlin, the court did not hold an
employer liable for failing to fire an employee with a criminal record because:
Such a risk of liability might make employers hesitant to hire those
people, severely limiting employment opportunities. Halverson’s
history of violence only includes a single conviction which resulted from
a domestic, not workplace, confrontation and an assault charge that was
dismissed. Requiring employers to fire employees or face liability under
these circumstances is untenable, especially considering Halverson’s
minimal contact with others. “Such a rule would deter employers from
hiring workers with a criminal record and ‘offend our civilized concept
that society must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those who
have erred so they can be assimilated into the community.’”
Id. at 453–54 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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employers to take excess precautionary measures to prevent hypothetical
wrongs.
2.

Punitive Damages

Law and economics theories of punitive damages have focused
primarily on under-enforcement, a key component of which is the
influence of the probability of detecting the wrongful conduct. 106 While
critics reject the viability of this non-retributive rationale for punitive
damages, it has emerged unscathed from the U.S. Supreme Court’s attack
on punitive damages and holds considerable sway with a number of
courts.107
One economic rationale for punitive damages is a cost-internalization
theory focusing on the likelihood of under-detection of a defendant’s
wrongdoing. Robert Cooter pioneered this theory. 108 And A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell elaborated in a seminal article, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, in which they argued that “the proper
magnitude of damages is the harm the defendant has caused, multiplied
by a factor reflecting the probability of his escaping liability.”109 As they
further explained, the use of a multiplier and excess damages over
compensatory damages “will make defendants pay on average for harm
actually done and thus will lead to socially desirable behavior in terms of
precautions and participation in risky activities.”110
Others have elaborated on the role of punitive damages to respond to
under-detection and under-enforcement more generally. In Punitive
Damages as Societal Damages, I extended the rationale beyond underdetection to include a broader array of factors that might lead

For discussion of the various economic theories of punitive damages, see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics, and Doctrine, in RES.
HANDBOOK ECON. TORTS 486, 488 (Jennifer Arlen ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Economic Analysis] (“The predominant law and economics theory of
punitive damages is based upon optimal deterrence or loss internalization and focuses on
the under-enforcement problem: supracompensatory damages are needed when underdetection of harms or other factors leads to inefficiently low expected liability, which is
insufficient to induce optimal care. Other contenders include gain elimination or
disgorgement and inducement of voluntary transfers, also known as the property rights
perspective.”).
107
See id.
108
Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV.
1143, 1148 (1989) (“In general, the punitive multiplier should equal the reciprocal of the
enforcement error for the sake of deterrence, which I call the ‘rule of the reciprocal.’”).
109
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 887 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
110
Id. at 887–88.
106
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compensatory damages to underestimate the total social harms inflicted
by the defendant’s actions.111
There is a continuing debate regarding whether the economic theory
for punitive damages has had any durable influence on the courts. As
judges, Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi led the way toward
recognition of the economic deterrence rationale by emphasizing the
significance of the defendant’s likelihood of escaping liability. Thus, in
Kemezy v. Peters, Judge Posner reasoned almost straight out of the law and
economics theorist’s playbook:
When a tortious act is concealable, a judgment equal to
the harm done by the act will underdeter. Suppose a
person who goes around assaulting other people is
caught only half the time. Then in comparing the costs,
in the form of anticipated damages, of the assaults with
the benefits to him, he will discount the costs (but not the
benefits, because they are realized in every assault) by 50
percent, and so in deciding whether to commit the next
assault he will not be confronted by the full social cost of
his activity.112
And in Ciraolo v. New York, a case involving city-wide illegal police stripsearching policies, Judge Calabresi proclaimed that “[s]uch a [multiplier]
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 369 (2003)
(“[T]he punitive multiplier, which focuses on underenforcement error due to nondetection
of harms, is in some sense a subset of the broader economic deterrence goal of internalization
of total costs.”). See also Sharkey, Economic Analysis, supra note 106, at 489 (“Underenforcement results from a variety of factors including under-detection of wrongful conduct,
failure to sue, plaintiffs’ inability to prove negligence and causation, and error.”); Joni Hersch
& W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229, 242 (2010)
(arguing that probability of detection should be combined with value of statistical life to
determine the appropriate level of punitive damages to optimally deter harmful behavior).
112
Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,
Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“The award of punitive damages in this
case . . . serves the . . . purpose of limiting the defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by
escaping detection and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he
commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to
make up for the times he gets away.”). The economic rationale for punitive damages seems
especially live and well in the Seventh Circuit. See Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d
499, 508 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Punitive damages are appropriate when some wrongful conduct
evades detection; a multiplier then both compensates and deters.”); FDIC v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The most straightforward rationale for punitive
damages . . . is that they are necessary to deter torts or crimes that are concealable. Suppose
the average defrauder is brought to book only half the time. To confront him with a sanction
that will make fraud worthless to him and thus deter him, it is necessary that when he is
caught he be made to pay twice as much as his profits.”).
111
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conception of punitive damages, again, is not new, and it has been
recognized by courts as well as scholars.” 113
Critics have nonetheless argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has flatout rejected the under-deterrence rationale for punitive damages. In State
Farm v. Campbell, the Court maintained that “the argument that State Farm
will be punished in only the rare case . . . had little to do with the actual
harm sustained by the Campbells.”114 Indeed, according to the Court,
such an argument would be “a departure from well-established
constraints on punitive damages.”115 The Court, however, provided scant
reasoning here. Indeed, in almost the same breath in which it criticized
the punitive multiplier approach, the Court echoed its statement from
BMW v. Gore that a higher ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
might be necessary where “the injury is hard to detect.”116
Moreover, in prior work, I have argued:
By reconceptualizing these underdeterrence damages as
societal compensation, as opposed to quasi-fines or
penalties, the societal damages approach would seem to
survive the retributive-punishment-focused due process
constraints of State Farm . . . . Moreover, the approach
would favor a new kind of distributive scheme that
would attempt either to compensate society directly for
the imposition of those harms or else to direct
compensation to some proxy that would attempt to
compensate categories of individuals likely harmed by a
defendant’s similar wrongdoing.117

Ciraolo v. New York, 216 F.3d 236, 237, 245 (2d Cir. 2000).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 425. In BMW v. Gore, Justice Stevens (for the majority) and Justice Breyer (in
concurrence) embraced under-detection as a rationale for punitive damages. 517 U.S. 559,
582 (1996) (Stevens, J.) (“A higher ratio [of punitive damages to compensatory damages] may
also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect . . . .”). Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Gore mentions economic theories of punitive damages that focus on ensuring
that a wrongdoer pays for “the total cost of the harm caused.” Id. at 592–93 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). He interprets these theories as permitting juries “to calculate punitive damages
by making a rough estimate of global harm, [and] dividing that estimate by a similarly rough
estimate of the number of successful lawsuits that would likely be brought.” Id. at 593.
117
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 111, at 401–02. See also
Sharkey, Economic Analysis, supra note 106, at 496 (“Despite its criticism of the optimal
deterrence rationale and its silence with respect to the alternative gain-elimination or marketcircumvention rationales, it would be wrong to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court has
closed the door entirely on economic rationales of punitive damages.”).
113
114
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Thus, to my mind, the economic deterrence rationale for punitive
damages persists—not only as a theoretical matter but also as a practical
reality in the courts.118
As a doctrinal matter, punitive damages can be imposed for
punishment or deterrence—by which I mean non-retributive, economic
deterrence. Punitive damages under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908,
Punitive Damages (“Restatement § 908”), though typically characterized as
serving as retributive punishment, can also serve a deterrent function
justified by under-detection (as a means of internalization of total societal
costs).119 The same holds true in the context of employer liability for
punitive damages based on employee intentional torts. Indeed, “[w]hile
the policy most often mentioned for requiring [employer] ratification or
authorization is punishment of the wrongdoer, the supposed deterrent
effect of punitive damages is frequently cited by courts not requiring
intentional acts.”120
B. Re-assessing Employer Liability for Employee Intentional Torts
In this Part, I explore how bringing the under-detection rationale to
the fore shapes the theoretical choice between employer strict-vicarious
liability and direct negligence liability for employee intentional torts. 121 I
then widen the focus to include the role of punitive damages. The stakes
Moreover, as I have argued (quite exhaustively, in the face of numerous critics’
protestations to the contrary), this conception of punitive damages as societal damages can
likewise withstand the Court’s further attack on punitive damages in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance:
Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 468–
69 (2010). See also Sharkey, Economic Analysis, supra note 106, at 495 (“The U.S. Supreme
Court, amidst its forays—or incursions—into the state law realm of punitive damages, has
always insisted that its analysis begins with the legitimate state interests served by punitive
damages. To date, the Court has given a quick nod to state-defined goals of punishment and
deterrence, before diving headlong into an analysis that, by and large, has emphasized
retributive punishment goals. But the states have, in essence, enabled the Court to go down
this path. They have, as yet, not exploited their power to redirect the Court—and thus the
evolution of punitive damages doctrine.” (emphasis omitted)).
119
Restatement § 908 provides:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in
the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 908(1)–(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
120
William T. Curtis, Liability of Employers for Punitive Damages Resulting from Acts of
Employees, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 829, 842 (1978).
121
See infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
118
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of a case (including likelihood of inducing settlement) increase
dramatically when employers can be held liable for punitive damages if
initially found liable for employee intentional torts. I explore the various
rules governing the viability of punitive damages in the vicarious liability
setting as well as with respect to direct negligence claims.122 Each of these
variants has been defended on deterrence grounds. To date, little work
has been done on assessing the salient differences between the
approaches.
1.

The Case for Expanding Strict-Vicarious Liability

As discussed above, strict liability may be more efficient than direct
negligence liability where there is a significant risk of under-detection.
Thus, the case for employer vicarious liability is stronger where there is a
significant risk of under-detection of potential employer preventative
measures. It is difficult to evaluate the prevalence of the under-detection
rationale in light of the lack of empirical data—or really prospects for
measuring—the relevant fraction of cases (or incidents) in which the
concern is rife.
That said, as we have seen, in employer direct liability cases, the
threshold knowledge and specification of preventative measures
requirements train the court’s focus on the prospect of cost-justified
precautions that the employer failed to take.123 And, in the words of the
Canadian Supreme Court:
Beyond the narrow band of employer conduct that
attracts direct liability in negligence lies a vast area where
imaginative and efficient administration and supervision
can reduce the risk that the employer has introduced into
the community. Holding the employer vicariously liable
for the wrongs of its employee may encourage the
employer to take such steps . . . .124

See infra Sections IV.B.2.b, IV.B.3.
See generally Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002) (discussing several cases in which
the courts analyze preventative measure requirements).
124
Chamallas, supra note 100, at 152–53 (quoting Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para.
33 (Can.) (emphasis added)). According to Chamallas, “The innovative aspect of Bazley is its
application of ‘enterprise risk’ to the realm of intentional torts and sexual abuse in
particular.” See id. at 181. The Bazley court also noted: “In many cases evidence will be
lacking or have long since disappeared. The proof of appropriate standards is a difficult and
uneven matter.” Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 32 (Can.). Here, I highlight
instead the under-detection rationale.
122
123
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To illustrate, recall the Malicki v. Doe church abuse case discussed
above.125 It seems fair to say that the court considered only a “narrow
band of employer conduct” when it decided to impose a fairly limited
duty upon the church.126 In so doing, it failed to consider myriad other
“imaginative” precautions that might have been taken or potential
methods of controlling employee behavior. For example, assuming there
is a long-term relationship between the church and its pastor, the church
could structure its bonus, promotion, and termination schemes to focus
on creating an environment attuned to preventing abuse as an
institutional matter. Or consider another case, Total Rehabilitation &
Medical Centers, Inc. v. E.B.O., in which the court rejected a negligent
supervision claim brought by a rehabilitation center patient who was
allegedly raped in a company-owned van during the course of an
employee’s assigned responsibility to transport the patient between
facilities.127 Employers have plenty of supervision and punishment
methods available to discourage tortious—and even criminal—behavior
like this. Perhaps the van could have been rigged with cameras, or
employer policies could prevent employees from being alone with a
patient.
In sum, strict liability could thus promote as-yet-unimagined and
currently untaken preventative measures. 128 In each of these cases, a
motivated and innovative employer could find ways to investigate
employees’ past conduct more thoroughly and supervise their present
conduct more comprehensively. Moreover, courts might increasingly rely

See supra text accompanying notes 70–72 (evaluating, in the context of sexual assault on
a minor, whether a church could be liable for negligent hiring for failing to look into a priest’s
background).
126
Compare Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, para 33 (Can.) (“Beyond the narrow band
of employer conduct that attracts direct liability in negligence lies a vast area where
imaginative and efficient administration and supervision can reduce the risk that the
employer has introduced into the community.”), with Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364–65
(Fla. 2002) (highlighting the requirement that the employer “knew or should have known of
the tortious conduct”).
127
See Total Rehab. & Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. E.B.O, 915 So. 2d 694, 695, 696–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (rejecting a negligent supervision claim brought by a patient allegedly raped by
a company employee during the course of his responsibilities). See also supra note 62 (listing
cases in which the court rejected claims against organizations providing services to
vulnerable populations).
128
See Bruce Feldthusen, Vicarious Liability for Sexual Torts, in TORTS TOMORROW: A TRIBUTE
TO JOHN FLEMING 221, 226 (Mullany & Linden eds., 1998) (“It often requires expensive,
profession-specific research studies to identify cost-effective measures. Absent vicarious
liability, there may be no incentive for the employer to contribute to this body of knowledge.
If employers are better positioned than plaintiffs, judges[,] or juries to identify the efficient
deterrence measures, then strict liability is the standard that will best encourage them to do
so.”) (footnote omitted).
125
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on outside experts who bring a wealth of experience in terms of
identifying the prevalence of certain types of under-detected harms in
various institutions and proposed strategies for preventing and mitigating
employee misconduct. For example, regarding sexual abuse in the
educational context, courts might take notice of the empirical evidence of
the prevalence of abuse as well as the existence of manuals and guidelines
for the detection and prevention of such abuse to substantiate claims that
there is a significant risk of under-detection of employer preventative
measures.129
2.

The Case for Expanding Direct Liability

Here I explore the possibility that, as an alternative to expanding the
scope for strict-vicarious liability, direct negligence liability could be
tweaked specifically to allow for more flexibility in terms of widening the
range (and imagination) of preventative measures considered by the
courts.130 Or, punitive damages could be added on top of existing
negligence liability to address under-detection.131
a.

Expanding Direct Negligence Claims

An alternative way to address, directly, the courts’ extremely narrow
interpretation of direct negligence liability and, indirectly, the underdetection issue would be to lower the burden on plaintiffs to establish
direct negligence liability to include a more flexible notion of preventative
measures.132 In other words, negligence-based direct liability might give
enough flexibility to courts without resorting to strict liability to take up
the slack.

Sexual misconduct in the educational context has been “long documented to be
widespread and prevalent in the United States.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands:
Restoring Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2042
(2016) (“Sexual harassment in education, which includes rape and other sexual assault, is a
recognized form of gender-based violence long documented to be widespread and prevalent
in the United States.” (citing, inter alia, Charol Shakeshaft, Educator Sexual Misconduct: A
Synthesis of Existing Literature, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (2004), http://www2.ed.gov/
rschstat/research/pubs/misconductreview/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GE3-ZCJ9]
(documenting an alarming incidence of teacher-on-student and other adult-on-student
sexual misconduct and abuse in all levels of public schools))). See also Charol Shakeshaft,
Know the Warning Signs of Educator Sexual Misconduct, PHI DELTA KAPPAN 8, 9 (Feb. 2013),
https://filestore.scouting.org/filestore/nyps/2013/pdf/Shakeshaft-Kappan20138.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WCB-CSWR].
130
See infra Section IV.B.2.a.
131
See infra Section IV.B.2.b.
132
Below, I also introduce a novel burden-shifting framework in the context of avoidance
of punitive damages. See infra Section IV.B.3.
129
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Several courts have acknowledged the need for some flexibility
inherent in the negligence standard in the institutional liability setting.
Thus, for example, courts have adjusted the degree and even necessity for
background checks based on the likely contact the employee will have
with the public.133 In a similar vein, courts have considered potential
preventative measures that go beyond background checks and screening
employees based on past actions. Consider, for example, Hicks ex rel.
Nolette, a New York case in which a fourteen-year-old was sexually
assaulted while residing at a youth detention facility. 134 The court
dismissed the vicarious liability and negligent hiring causes of action
against the facility but allowed the claims of negligent training and
supervision to proceed.135 Even though the plaintiff had to identify the
untaken precautions, the court applied a far-reaching inquiry into the
reasonableness of the facility’s actions. To begin, the court credited the:
record testimony [that] indicate[d] that defendant
provided staff members, including Williams [the alleged
assaulter], with written training manuals regarding
proper interaction with troubled youth, including
instructions on maintaining adequate interpersonal
boundaries.
The facility director stated that she
attempted to hold staff meetings “on a regular basis” to
review the facility’s programmatic goals, and Williams
similarly testified that he was subject to regular
assessments by supervisory staff.136
But the court then probed the extent of these measures, finding that:
(1) “there was a general reluctance on the part of several staff members to
report policy violations to supervisors or register complaints regarding
staff conduct”; (2) “[o]ther complaints to supervisors regarding Williams’
improper conduct appear to have gone unaddressed”; and (3) defendant
did not test or otherwise ensure that its staff members were
133
See, e.g., Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 447–53 (S.D. 2008) (“[W]here job
requirements bring an employee into frequent contact with the public, or individuals who
have special relationships with the employer, the inquiry required expands beyond the job
application and personal interview to an investigation of the applicant/employee’s
background.”); Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321–22 (Colo. 1992)
(“The scope of the employer’s duty in exercising reasonable care in a hiring decision will
depend largely on the anticipated degree of contact which the employee will have with other
persons in performing his or her employment duties.”).
134
Hicks ex rel. Nolette v. Berkshire Farm Ctr. Servs. Youth, 999 N.Y.S.2d 879, 881 (App.
Div. 2014).
135
Id. at 881–82.
136
Id. at 881.
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knowledgeable and compliant with its written policies and instructional
materials.137
In another case, Foradori v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit noted that an
employer could be liable for negligent supervision when it took “a rather
passive managerial approach” that avoided directly asking employees
about an assault that occurred during business hours and failed to
“adequately inform [the employee] of the adverse consequences which
would result if he behaved in a violent manner towards a customer.” 138
Among the actions the employer could have taken to avoid liability for the
employee’s intentional tort were: (1) “steps to train and discipline its
employees to take reasonable precautions to control and defuse customerrelated altercations on its premises”; and (2) adequate training of
managers to comply with work rules and manuals that gave instructions
for how to deal with employee misconduct.139
A New Jersey court likewise took an expansive view of employer
direct negligence liability by recognizing a corporation’s duty to monitor
employee usage of office computers in order to prevent the uploading of
child pornography.140 Relying on Restatement § 317, the court found that
the employer “was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to stop [its
e]mployee’s activities,” which federal lawmakers determined constituted
a threat to children forced to engage in such activities. 141 Specifically, the
court held that “defendant had a duty to report [e]mployee’s activities to
the proper authorities and to take effective internal action to stop those
activities, whether by termination or some less drastic remedy.”142

Id. at 882.
Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 493 (5th Cir. 2008).
139
Id.
140
See Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1167–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(discussing the duty to monitor usage of company computers).
141
Id.
142
Id. The court’s recognition of a fairly expansive set of preventative measures that
should have been taken was, nonetheless, in a case in which the court had no difficulty
finding that the employer was sufficiently on notice of the specific risk posted by its
employee:
[D]efendant was on notice of Employee’s pornographic related
computer activity by early 2000. By late March 2001, defendant had
knowledge, through its supervisory personnel, that Employee had
visited a variety of “porn sites” including one that suggested child
pornography. Yet, despite being reported to high level management, no
action was taken. A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that an
appropriate investigation at that time would have revealed the extent of
Employee’s activities and, presumably, would have led to action to shut
down those activities.
Id. at 1169.
137
138
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Thus, while there are manifold cases in which the employer’s lack of
knowledge of the precise risk of the employee’s intentional tort is an
insuperable barrier to recovery, in others, courts have exercised discretion
and considered fairly wide-ranging potential precautions the employer
could take to reduce the likelihood of harm.
b.

Adding Punitive Damages

Moreover, if the risk of under-detection is significant, punitive
damages can also be awarded in cases of direct employer negligence
liability. Because Restatement § 317 imposes direct liability on an employer
for its own negligence, punitive damages may be justified under
Restatement § 908.143
In Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that punitive damages could be awarded against employers
found liable in § 317 direct negligence claims.144 The court applied its
traditional direct punitive damages analysis, motivated by the primary
concern of deterring future outrageous conduct. 145 Moreover, the court
made clear that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is
outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.”146
The court noted:
It may be that, as a practical matter, it proves more
difficult to sustain a claim for punitive damages against
the “master” in the negligent supervision context than it
might be with other negligence-based torts, given that the
more direct harm (which, as here, may well involve an
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (explaining when
punitive damages are justified).
144
Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 773 (Pa. 2005) (“We see no
reason . . . to distinguish between claims sounding under Section 317 and other actions
sounding in negligence for purposes of punitive damages.”).
145
Id. at 771 (“The only purpose of punitive damages is to deter outrageous conduct.”).
146
Id. at 770 (emphasis added) (first quoting Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984);
and then quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). Here, I
take “reckless indifference” to open up room for the award of non-retributive societal
damages. See Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 111, at 369.
Admittedly, this may stretch what the court had in mind. The court noted that because
punitive damages are intended to punish the tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter
him and others like him from similar conduct in the future, “The state of mind of the actor is
vital. The act, or the failure to act, must be intentional, reckless or malicious.” Hutchison, 870
A.2d at 770. See also id. (“[P]unitive damages are penal in nature and are proper only in cases
where the defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton or
reckless conduct.”).
143
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intentional tort) will usually have been inflicted directly
by the “servant.” But, that is a matter for proof that
attends the particular case; there is no general
proscription in law against pursuing punitive damages in
the Section 317 context, where the facts so warrant. 147
Several courts applying Pennsylvania law and Restatement § 908 have
held that punitive damages may be awarded in § 317 negligent
supervision cases. In Reichert v. Pathway School, John Doe was repeatedly
sexually abused by an older student, T.Y., on the premises of Pathway
School.148 The plaintiff sued the school, alleging negligent supervision of
the abusive older student.149 The court allowed punitive damages to
proceed in the case, given that the plaintiff put forth sufficient facts to
support a finding of the school’s “reckless indifference to John Doe’s
safety.”150 And likewise in White v. Punita Group, Inc., punitive damages
were allowed to go forward in a case in which the plaintiff alleged the
employer was reckless or grossly negligent for failing to exercise
reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising an employee.151 In
that case, defendant Punita Group sent its employee to a gun show
without supervision or training on “handl[ing] firearms and ammunition
despite the fact that his job required handling both items.” 152

Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 773 (emphasis omitted).
Reichert v. Pathway Sch., 935 F. Supp. 2d 808, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 825. Admittedly, the court elaborated factors evincing “reckless indifference” that
seem to approximate “reprehensibility” under the circumstances, especially given the
school’s fiduciary relationship to students. According to the court:
These facts relate to violations of school policies, the physical
circumstances surrounding the sexual acts, and [the school’s]
understanding of the behaviors of John Doe and T.Y. Of particular note
is the fact that T.Y.’s disciplinary record reflected over one hundred
discipline citations, including incidents of a sexual nature and
numerous elopements. In addition, many of the sexual encounters
occurred over a period of up to thirty minutes and took place in a
bathroom located a few feet away from John Doe’s classroom.
Id.
151
White v. Punita Grp., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-1195, 2016 WL 1117476, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18,
2016).
152
Id. The court concluded: “It is too early to determine where Punita Group’s alleged
conduct falls on the spectrum between negligence and reckless indifference. At this stage,
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a claim for punitive damages. Whether it remains viable will
depend on discovery.” Id. at *6.
147
148
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The Weak Case for Vicarious Liability Punitive Damages and a Novel
Burden-Shifting Approach

As we have just seen, one strategy for addressing significant underdetection in the institutional liability context is to recognize punitive
damages on top of direct negligence liability. 153 But, if instead, strictvicarious liability is imposed (as opposed to direct negligence) to address
under-detection, then the case for imposing punitive damages vicariously
is comparatively weaker. Thus, through the lens of under-detection,
vicarious liability serves as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages.
This view of vicarious liability as a quasi-substitute for punitive
damages could lend support to the courts’ enforcement of a doctrinal
dividing line between vicarious and direct employer liability—albeit not
based on “scope of employment” but instead on avoidance of overdeterrence in situations in which vicarious liability has been imposed
when plaintiff could not identify specific untaken precautions (or meet the
heightened threshold knowledge requirement) in an institutional context
where the risk of under-detection is significant. Nonetheless, it is not clear
that the choice of the type of liability should rest with the defendant.
Given the “scope of employment” doctrinal dividing line, an employer
might have a strategic incentive to concede that its employee’s actions fall
within the “scope of employment” so as to foreclose a direct liability claim
that could be combined with punitive damages. Courts might respond in
such a circumstance by shifting the burden to the defendant to
demonstrate that it has suitable preventative measures in place.
The “pure” vicarious liability punitive damages rule—recognized in
some jurisdictions—recognizes punitive damages so long as the employee
acts within the scope of employment.154 In other words, it extends strict-

See supra Section IV.B.2.b.
See, e.g., Potomac Leasing Co. v. Bulger, 531 So. 2d 307, 311 (Ala. 1988) (reaffirming the
scope of employment rule in the face of a challenge based on the Restatement’s complicity
rule); J.B. Hunt Transp. v. Doss, 899 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ark. 1995) (reaffirming longstanding
scope of employment rule); Wiper v. Downtown Dev. Corp. Tucson, 372 P.2d 200, 201 (Ariz.
1987) (“Arizona has specifically rejected the Restatement view in favor of a rule allowing
punitive damages against an employer for acts of its employees ‘so long as committed in the
furtherance of the employer’s business and acting within the scope of employment.’”);
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869) (adopting the scope of employment rule
for corporations as well as individual employers); Embry v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 969–71 (Md.
1982) (declining to adopt the Restatement rule favoring a broad scope of employment for
holding an employer vicariously liable for punitive damages); Ray v. Detroit, 242 N.W.2d
494, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming the scope of employment rule); Tietjens v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75, 88 (Mo. 1967) (same); Bierman v Aramark Refreshment Servs.,
198 P.3d 877, 884 (Okla. 2008) (declining to adopt Restatement rule); Beauchamp v. Winnsboro
Granite Corp., 101 S.E. 856, 858–59 (S.C. 1920) (articulating the scope of employment rule);
153
154
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vicarious liability to punitive damages without requiring ratification or
authorization by the employer. The rule has been defended on deterrence
grounds “especially in the case of corporations, who can only act through
their agents.”155 As one court reasoned, “if such damages will encourage
employers to exercise closer control over their servants for the prevention
of outrageous torts, that is sufficient ground for awarding them.” 156
But critics, most notably William Curtis, have resisted the theory:
[E]ven if it is assumed that an employer should be liable
for all the acts of his employees in the scope of their
duties, there is nothing to indicate that employers are
generally aware of such liability, or that considerations of
liability have any more effect upon hiring practices than
do ordinary business considerations. This broad rule of
liability could, however, significantly increase a
plaintiff’s chances of a larger recovery, since it is generally
easier to establish liability when no voluntary act is
required other than the initial hiring of the employee. A
sizeable judgment for punitive damages, however, does
not necessarily mean that the policy of holding employers
responsible for their employees’ conduct has had the
intended effect. The prudent employer will insure
against such losses, add the cost of the premiums to his
cost of doing business, and thereby transfer the risk to the
ultimate consumer of his product.157
It is not necessarily the case, however, that the insurability of vicarious
liability punitive damages thwarts the deterrence cost-internalization
mechanism. To the extent that insurance can play a risk-management
role—providing oversight of institutional and employer policies
regarding hiring, training, and supervising employees—then the
deterrence function persists. Insurance companies can also engage in
experience rating of their premia to further bolster the deterrence effect.
Moreover, the very fact that states allow for insurability of vicarious
liability punitive damages (even some states that foreclose insurance for
direct punitive damages as against public policy) signals (at least an

Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526, 533 (Tenn. 1974) (affirming a lower court decision which
reaffirmed the longstanding scope of employment rule).
155
Stroud v. Denny’s Rest., Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 793 n.2 (Or. 1975) (quoting PROSSER ON TORTS
12, § 2 (4th ed. 1971)).
156
Id.
157
Curtis, supra note 120, at 847 (footnote omitted).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 2

40

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

implicit) embrace of the deterrent (non-retributive) function of punitive
damages in this area.158
But—as we have seen—if the justification for imposing strictvicarious liability on the employer is to mitigate the risk of underdetection and thus enhance deterrence,159 then the imposition of strict
liability punitive damages (at least on the grounds of under-detection)
would over-deter. However, before allowing a defendant to immunize
itself from punitive damages by, for example, conceding vicarious liability
(i.e., stipulating that its employee acted “within the scope of
employment,” no matter how much of a stretch), it is worth considering
whether courts should impose some affirmative burden on the defendant
to come forward with evidence that it has preventative precautionary
measures in place.
This novel burden-shifting approach would be information-forcing in
the sense that evidence of the institutional culture and precautionary
preventative measures are likely to be within the exclusive control of the
employer. Under this scheme, the employer must demonstrate to the
court that it has such preventative measures in place in order to avoid
negligence-based liability that could serve as a predicate for the
imposition of punitive damages.
As far as I know, no court has applied such a burden-shifting
approach. Instead, as described above, the courts’ approach to the “scope
of employment” as a doctrinal dividing line between vicarious liability
claims and direct negligence has been theoretically justified, if at all, on
enterprise causation grounds. There is an analogous information-forcing
affirmative defense imposed on employers in the Title VII vicarious
liability sexual harassment context.160 But whereas in the Title VII context
the employer’s setting forth of preventative policies in place would
constitute an affirmative defense to the strict liability claim, the burdenshifting paradigm I am proposing here would not immunize the employer
from strict-vicarious liability but instead only foreclose the addition of
direct negligence claims and punitive damages.

For discussion of the insurability of punitive damages generally, as well as in the
context of vicarious liability punitive damages, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the
Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409 (2005).
159
See supra Part IV.A (discussing under-detection as a basis for imposing strict-vicarious
liability on employers).
160
See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (holding that, where
an employer engages in a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII, it cannot be held liable
for punitive damages).
158
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The Efficiency Case for the Restatement’s Punitive Damages
“Complicity Rule”

Restatement § 909 (“Punitive Damages Against A Principal”) marked
a departure from an approach of strict-vicarious liability for punitive
damages incurred as a result of an employee tort committed within the
scope of employment, to a fault-based rule requiring some complicity in
the wrongful act by the employer.161 States that allow punitive damages
are roughly evenly divided on whether to allow for “pure” vicarious
liability for punitive damages as opposed to a more restrictive
“complicity” rule, requiring some element of fault on the part of the
employer.162
Restatement § 909 provides:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a
master or other principal because of an act by an agent if,
but only if[:] (a) the principal or a managerial agent
authorized the doing and the manner of the act[;] or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial
agent was reckless in employing or retaining him[;] or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment[;] or (d) the
principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.163
Known as the “complicity rule,” § 909 is a kind of hybrid falling between
the poles of the pure vicarious liability rule and no vicarious liability rule,
but designed to limit the scope of the pure vicarious liability rule.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (detailing when
punitive damages can be assessed against a principal).
162
See Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Iowa 1983) (“Of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia, twenty-two states follow either the Restatement or a more restrictive
rule; twenty states follow the course of employment rule; four states do not allow punitive
damages; four states have not addressed the issue; and the rule in Iowa is in question.”). See
also Michael F. Sturley, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 501, 513 (2010)
(“[T]he majority rule (or at least the plurality rule) may be that the normal respondeat
superior standard for tort liability also applies to the imposition of punitive damages,
meaning that an employer can be liable in punitive damages for the misconduct of any
employee acting in the scope of his or her employment—without any complicity
whatsoever.” (footnote omitted)).
163
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Section 909 also requires
that the underlying act of the employee “must be of a character subjecting the agent to
liability for exemplary damages before the master can be held vicariously liable for such
damages.” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Marvin Riggs Co., 584 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979).
161
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Fairness Justification

The Restatement complicity approach was motivated by—and is
typically justified on account of—fairness or morality considerations.
While the employer is not required to have acted with willful disregard or
wantonness to be liable for punitive damages, Restatement § 909 arose
from fairness concerns, “which make it improper ordinarily to award
punitive damages against one who himself is personally innocent and
therefore liable only vicariously.” 164 As Clarence Morris wrote in 1960, the
complicity rule “wisely protects corporations from vicarious liability for
punitive damages when a properly supervised and disciplined employee
acts outrageously; and it wisely allows for punitive damages awards
against some corporations whose institutional conscience should be
aroused.”165 The Supreme Court of Iowa has likewise embraced the
Restatement rule as:
more consistent with the purpose of punitive damages
than is the course of employment rule. Although there
are arguments in favor of the course of employment rule,
the weakening of the deterrence effect, the increase in the
cost of legitimate activities, and the injustice of punishing
the innocent, all outweigh whatever benefits the course of
employment rule might present.166
b.

Efficiency Justification

On occasion, courts have justified the Restatement § 909 complicity
rule on deterrence grounds:
To the extent that it appears that a corporation might have
been able to prevent wrongful conduct by an employee,
the corporation should be liable for punitive damages.
Indeed, the threat of punitive damages should be an
incentive to the corporation to take precautions with its
employees. If, on the other hand, the corporation could
have done nothing to prevent the employee’s wrongful
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 909 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979). See also Enright v.
LuBow, 493 A.2d 1288, 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (adopting the Restatement rule
on fairness grounds “based on the notion that it would be improper ordinarily to award
punitive damages against one who is personally innocent and therefore liable only
vicariously”).
165
Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 222
(1960) (emphasis added).
166
Briner, 337 N.W.2d at 867 (emphasis added).
164
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conduct, punitive damages can have little deterrent effect,
either to that corporation or as an example to other
employers.
This distinction is recognized by the
complicity rule which in assessing punitive damages for
reckless hiring or retaining of an unfit employee provides
an incentive for taking care in selecting and training
personnel.167
Less well recognized is the fact that Restatement § 909 provides a very
broad definition of complicity, “extend[ing] employer liability to
employee conduct which it would be difficult to show was authorized, but
for which the employer is at least partially blameworthy because he
employed an unfit person.”168 But “blameworthy” may overstate the case.
167
Id. at 865–66. See also Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 903 (S.D. 1991) (characterizing
the Restatement approach as focusing on deterrence, specifically § 909(b), which “in assessing
punitive damages for reckless hiring or retaining of an unfit employee provides an incentive
for taking care in selecting and training personnel”).
168
Briner, 337 N.W.2d at 866. Several states, however, have explicitly rejected liability on
this basis (namely, hiring an unfit employee), insisting instead that the principal must have
participated in, authorized, or ratified its agent’s acts. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp.,
551 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Haw. 1982) (“Punitive damages may be recovered against a
corporate defendant only if the corporation expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified the
tortious act of its agent.”); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Nw., 606 P.2d 944, 957 (Idaho 1980)
(“It is well established in Idaho that punitive damages may not be assessed against a
principal based on the acts of an agent absent a clear showing that the agent had managerial
status or that the principal ordered or ratified the acts in question.”); Openshaw v. Oregon
Auto. Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929, 32 (Idaho 1971) (“To be entitled to an award of punitive damages
against a corporation the complaining party must show that the principal . . . participated in
or authorized or ratified the agent’s acts.”); Brashear v. Packers, 883 P.2d 1278, 1280 (N.M.
1994) (“The long-standing rule in New Mexico is that an employer is liable in punitive
damages for the acts of its employee only in cases in which the employer ‘has authorized,
participated in[,] or ratified the acts of the employee.’”); Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co.
v. Pan Am World Servs., 879 P.2d 772, 775 (N.M. 1994) (“It is a well-established rule in New
Mexico that a principal may be held liable for punitive damages when the principal has in
some way authorized, ratified, or participated in the wanton, oppressive, malicious,
fraudulent, or criminal acts of its agent.”); AAA Pool Serv. & Supply v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 479 A.2d 112, 116 (R.I. 1984) (requiring that the principal have participated in,
ratified, or authorized a tortious act before punitive damages may be imposed). See also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(d)(1) (Westlaw through 2018) (“In no case shall exemplary or punitive
damages be assessed . . . against: (1) [a] principal or employer for the acts of an agent or
employee unless the questioned conduct was authorized or ratified by a person expressly
empowered to do so on behalf of the principal or employer.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.184(3) (Westlaw through 2018) (“In no case shall punitive damages be assessed against
a principal or employer for the act of an agent or employee unless such principal or employer
authorized or ratified or should have anticipated the conduct in question.”); Saint Joseph
Healthcare, Inc. v. Thomas, 487 S.W.3d 864, 873 (Ky. 2016) (clarifying that, under Kentucky
statute § 411.184(3), punitive damages may not be granted against an employer for conduct
of an employee “unless the offensive conduct was 1) authorized by the employer; 2)
anticipated by the employer; or 3) ratified by the employer”).
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There is no explicit requirement that the employer’s act be sufficiently
reprehensible to meet the given state’s punitive damages standard. 169
Section 909(b) requires employers to have been “reckless” in hiring an
And some states employ a standard nearly
unfit individual.170
indistinguishable from negligence. 171
We are now ready to appreciate that the Restatement’s complicity rule
for punitive damages can be justified not only on fairness grounds but also
from an efficiency perspective.
Punitive damages per § 909(b)
(“reckless[ly]” employ “unfit” agent) are thus akin to punitive damages
under § 908 with direct negligence liability as a predicate (at least where
states have interpreted “recklessly” as akin to “negligently”). 172 Punitive
damages on top of direct negligence liability, moreover, can be
theoretically justified by the risk of under-detection and under-deterrence.
169
See, e.g., Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981)
(“Although the misconduct of the employee, upon which the vicarious liability of the
employer for punitive damages is based, must be willful and wanton, it is not necessary that
the fault of the employer, independent of his employee’s conduct, also be willful and wanton.
It is sufficient that the plaintiff allege and prove some fault on the part of the employer which
foreseeably contributed to the plaintiff’s injury to make him vicariously liable for punitive
damages.”).
170
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
171
See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 402 P.2d 628, 631 (Colo. 1965) (holding that a
corporation can be held vicariously liable for punitive damages where it “failed to exercise
proper care in selecting its servants”) (emphasis added); Mercury Motors Express, Inc., 393 So.
2d at 548 (noting that punitive damages against the employer were “justified . . . because the
plaintiff alleged and proved not only willful, wanton, or outrageous conduct on the part of
the employee but also negligence on the part of the employer which contributed to the
plaintiff’s injury” (emphasis added)); Gray v. Allison Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 370 N.E.2d
747, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (“It is well established in Ohio that punitive damages may not
be recovered against a corporation in the absence of evidence that the corporation . . . was
negligent in the selection of its employees.” (emphasis added)).
Other states, however, employ a more stringent standard than recklessness. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (Westlaw through 2018) (“An employer shall not be liable for
[punitive] damages . . . based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer
had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others . . . .”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 subd.
2(2) (Westlaw through 2018) (“Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master
or principal because of an act done by an agent only if . . . (2) the agent was unfit and the
principal deliberately disregarded a high probability that the agent was unfit . . . .”); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.007(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2017) (stating that an employer is only
vicariously liable for punitive damages if “[t]he employer had advance knowledge that the
employee was unfit for the purposes of the employment and employed the employee with a
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others”). See also Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243, 255 (Nev. 2008) (noting that “conscious disregard” under the
Nevada statute requires more culpability than recklessness).
172
See, e.g., Bryant v. Livigni, 619 N.E.2d 550, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (reasoning that
§ 909(b) liability is based upon “the wrongful conduct of the employer itself,” not on a
vicarious liability theory).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/2

Sharkey: Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicario

2018]

Employees’ Intentional Torts

45

Moreover, with respect to the imposition of vicarious liability punitive
damages, the Restatement’s complicity rule mitigates the risk of overdeterrence by requiring some degree of employer fault (i.e., “authorized”
per § 909(a); or “ratified or approved” per § 909(d)).173 Finally, it limits the
pure vicarious “scope of employment” liability to agents acting in
“managerial capacity” per § 909(c).174
V. CONCLUSION
The overall reluctance to find institutional liability for employees’
intentional torts may have fueled the doctrinal puzzle whereby “scope of
employment” has emerged as a dividing line between employer vicarious
liability and direct negligence liability. Perhaps the courts’ attempts to
narrow the scope of vicarious liability and negligence causes of action,
respectively, have led to further confusion whereby such causes of action
are also treated as mutually exclusive, characterized by which side of the
“scope of employment” line the employee’s intentional tort falls. 175
But unpacking this doctrinal puzzle is only the prelude to the wider
ambition of my Article, which is to reconsider the choice between
alternative institutional liability approaches. In particular, with a
renewed focus on the under-detection of employer preventative
measures, I have set forth a framework for reassessing the comparative
strength of different forms of institutional liability, namely strict-vicarious
liability and direct negligence theories, with or without the imposition of
punitive damages.
Several key insights follow from this framework. If employer
vicarious liability is imposed at least in part for under-detection of
preventative measures, then perhaps vicarious liability should be
considered as a quasi-substitute for punitive damages in direct liability
situations, likewise imposed for under-detection purposes.
Such
recognition would simultaneously strengthen the case for punitive
damages in direct negligence (§ 317) claims and weaken the case for
vicarious liability punitive damages. Moreover, Restatement § 909—
typically defended as a “complicity rule” limiting the imposition of
vicarious-punitive liability on fairness grounds—is justified on economic
deterrence grounds by allowing punitive damages coupled with direct
negligence liability but limiting its operation in the vicarious liability
sphere.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(a), (d) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Id. § 909(c).
175
Cf. Feldthusen, supra note 128, at 224 (“[O]nce intentional employee wrongdoing is in
issue, some inexplicable doctrinal slippage occurs.”).
173
174
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